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‘working at the grass-roots or flax-
roots level … become aware of trends 
and emerging issues earlier than the 
government. In short it is difficult to argue 
that such groups are not essential to any 
modern state’ (Salter, 2004, p.9). In New 
Zealand this role has been acknowledged 
in law since the mid-19th century (see 
Tennant, O’Brien and Sanders, 2008; 
Eichbaum and Shaw, 2006; Mulgan, 2004; 
Jesson, 1992) and is referred to in a range 
of recent government documents (see 
Ministry of Social Development, 2012; 
Office for the Community and Vountary 
Sector, 2008; Cabinet Office, 2011). But it 
is not unchallenged. This article examines 
how the changing relationship between the 
state and the community and voluntary 
sector has resulted in the democratic voice 
of the sector being heavily constrained.
During 2008 and 2009 we surveyed 
a purposive sample of community and 
voluntary  sector organisations in New 
Zealand with the express intention of 
testing their engagement in democratic 
decision-making under the Labour-led 
(1999–2008) and National-led (from 2008) 
coalition governments. Responses to the 
survey show clearly that organisations 
in the sector see themselves as having a 
major role to play in democratic decision-
making. As one of our respondents noted: 
‘It is vital that the organisations directly 
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There is a long-standing acknowledgement by the public, 
government and academics of the essential democratic 
role of the community and voluntary sector. The sector is 
acknowledged as a conduit to government of information on 
society’s unmet needs and preferences (Maddison, Denniss 
and Hamilton, 2004, p.vii). As Salter observes, organisations
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involved in delivering services play a 
significant role in the political decision-
making in New Zealand’ (health service 
provider). Additionally, our respondents 
perceive themselves as having a role in the 
following areas: speaking up for the most 
marginalised of our society; ensuring 
policy meets the real needs of New 
Zealanders; and ensuring a better society. 
However, the responses from 153 social 
service and advocacy organisations from 
around New Zealand also highlighted 
that the role of the community and 
voluntary sector in public debate has not 
been actively welcomed by governments 
in recent decades (Grey and Sedgwick, 
2013). Responding to the core question 
of the survey – ‘what do you think about 
successive governments’ attitudes to public 
debate?’ – 27.6% of our respondents said 
debate had been silenced, 42.4% said 
debate was tolerated (i.e. ‘None of our 
members has been arrested yet!’), and 
30% said that successive governments 
had encouraged debate. Added to this 
direct response on democratic debate, 
the written responses to the 32 survey 
questions further confirmed the existence 
of a democratic deficit in New Zealand 
between 1999 and 2009: only 87 of 
the 595 written responses given in the 
returned survey forms affirmed that 
debate was encouraged by two successive 
governments.
The democratic deficit, as defined 
by Beetham, refers to a ‘substantial 
and systematic failing in relation to 
international standards of good practice 
in some important feature of a country’s 
democratic life’ (Beetham, 2013, pp.1-2). 
With regard to New Zealand, Beetham 
et al. (2002, p.55-6) pointed to a clear 
discrepancy between ‘high levels of 
citizen participation in elections and 
civic associations’ and strong feelings of 
disempowerment among the public. This 
was shown in surveys in which 85.4% 
believed they had little control over the 
actions of politicians; 61.6% believed 
that they will get nowhere by talking to 
government officials; and 67.4% felt that 
government will not respond to public 
opinion.
So, what is constraining the role of 
the community and voluntary sector 
in democratic debate? According to 
respondents to our survey,  it is the very 
nature of their relationship with the state 
that has contributed to an environment 
in which debate is discouraged in some 
cases and barely tolerated in others. For 
example:
[Debate is] not encouraged. People 
who speak out have been verbally 
attacked – possibly this had led 
to loss of contract but this is not 
clear. Government has been less 
transparent about its intentions, 
which is a way of restricting debate. 
(Health provider)
Our experience from about 2006 
onwards was that public criticism 
or challenge was discouraged 
and responses from some senior 
Government Ministers was 
contemptuous. Public servants were 
very cautious and very reluctant 
to openly pursue advocacy issues. 
(Social service provider)
It’s difficult to describe without 
becoming despondent and emotional. 
Throughout our organisation we are 
struggling to remain positive [in the 
face of] rapidity of changes imposed 
by current government policy which 
undervalue, undermine and under 
fund our area of expertise and all 
without negotiation! (Social service 
provider)
Respondents drew our attention 
clearly to the fact that those who speak 
for the marginalised have themselves 
been marginalised. They explained 
that speaking up on behalf of their 
communities was frequently interpreted 
as self-interest, and that their knowledge 
and expertise was dismissed, distrusted 
or treated as unsubstantiated anecdote. 
Added to this, their expressed aim – to 
give more than they receive – had been 
heavily constrained by the mandatory 
need to meet compliance requirements. 
Persistent comments from our 
survey respondents on the constraints 
on democratic engagement focused our 
minds on how this had evolved: how could 
organisations born out of civil societies’ 
needs, generated by voluntary effort and 
concern for communities and funded by 
government grants over many decades 
in New Zealand be redirected and their 
attentions otherwise focused? The answer, 
we argue, lies primarily in the ‘contract’ 
and the type of relationships contracts 
generate between government and the 
community and voluntary sector.
The neo-liberal contract state and society
It has been 18 years since The State Under 
Contract was published, in which John 
Martin stated that the contract model:
replaces hierarchy and command as 
the mechanism by which the parts 
are linked together … to achieve the 
purposes of government.
… It has unquestionably assisted 
the achievement of considerable 
efficacy gains – if for no other 
reason than to require agencies to 
attempt to articulate the purpose 
for which they exist. I do, however 
question its universal applicability 
… and the implications for political 
accountability. (Martin, 1995, p.37) 
The mechanism of the contract, as 
Martin intimated, now inhabits a myriad 
of spaces between the individual, civil 
society and the body politic in New 
Zealand. These contracts are for the most 
part classical as opposed to relational 
(Martin, 1995): that is, they centre on 
a fee for service arrangement and the 
functions of provider/purchaser are 
separated. In these classical contracts the 
funder specifies the duration, outcomes 
and sanctions for non-compliance, and 
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the funder’s needs rather than those 
of the community have a medium for 
assertion.
The responses from our survey 
participants show that the mechanism 
of the contract has the uncanny capacity 
to generate fear, to focus minds on the 
survival of the fittest and to sideline 
public debate, forcing the attention of 
providers onto meeting the demands of 
funders.
Services are now ‘fighting’ for 
survival which leaves little time or 
energy for public debate. (Social 
service provider)
[Governments are] only 
interested in review and cost-cutting. 
Only the Mäori Party is still entering 
into community dialogue. (Feminist 
social service provider)
Under National, Ministers and 
officials have their own agendas … 
and consultations … appear often 
to be a waste of time. Other times 
advice is taken but to further their 
purpose and not that of the sector. 
(Advocacy organisation)
Contracts not only mediate relation-
ships between the state and the commu-
nity and voluntary sector; they determine 
the structure and outcomes of the rela-
tionships. As one of our respondents put 
it, their organisation has had the ability 
to negotiate ‘within parameters set by 
Labour Government – the issue re: where 
the parameter[s] lie are as relevant now 
as then’ (education organisation).
However, there are no guarantees that 
community needs, once recognised and 
given policy priority by the state, will 
remain ‘relevant’:
[We lost funding due to] change of 
work; change of government policy. 
(Social service provider)
They [National] changed priorities 
and our issues/conditions have been 
moved down the list. (Mental health 
provider)
What the survey responses intimate is 
that the move to contracting has led to 
a transformation of civil society (against 
the wishes of the community and 
voluntary sector) while maintaining a 
semblance of democracy. This trajectory 
is discussed by Milbourne and Cushman 
(2013, p.489), who note that ‘what appears 
to be trust is a facade for power, meaning 
is managed, distorted or imposed by the 
dominant participant’, in this case the 
state. According to Carmel and Harlock 
(quoting Newman, 2001), this so-called 
‘partnership’ also presents an ‘illusory 
unity’ which masks the differences 
between providers, which are ‘profoundly 
shaped by their particular, and varied 
social origins’ (Carmel and Harlock, 
2008, p.159).
Peck, Theodore and Brenner 
(2012) have described this process as a 
‘contradictory dialectic’ represented by 
‘roll-back (de-regulatory) and roll-out 
(re-regulatory)’ processes. The former, 
they say, is rationalised as ‘deregulation, 
devolution, and even democratisation’, 
whereas the latter ‘is marked by 
widespread adoption of “market 
conforming” regulatory incursion – from 
the selective empowerment of community 
organisations and NGOs as (flexible, low 
cost, non-state) service providers … to 
hybrid governance in the form of public-
private partnerships’ (Peck, Theodore and 
Benner, 2012, p.23). As is demonstrated 
in comments by the minister of social 
development, Paula Bennett, in the 2012 
Ministry of Social Development pamphlet 
Investing in Services for Outcomes, the 
location of responsibility and power in 
this contract environment is clear:
I will discontinue contracts where 
providers have continued to not 
meet Government expectations. This 
is an example of focused contract 
management that will support 
providers to deliver high quality, 
effective services. (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2012)
A classic case is that of Supergrans 
Christchurch, who were forced to close 
after 17 years of providing ‘in-home 
mentoring to hundreds of people’. 
Supergrans, which received 67% of its 
funding from the ministry, found that 
the expectations of the ministry did not 
match the organisation’s values. Their 
manager, Sue Yorke, was quoted as saying 
that Supergrans was a ‘victim of its own 
success’, adding:
The Supergrans way of supporting 
people requires time to build a 
relationship and trust, and the 
move to working with more people 
for shorter periods of time isn’t 
conducive to helping people make 
substantive changes in their lives. 
(Mathewson, 2013) 
The mechanism was as simple as 
replacing the social contract with the 
competitive contract. To quote Adamson’s 
rendition of Gramsci, the competitive 
contract now inhabits the space between 
‘large scale bureaucratic structures of the 
state and economy on the one hand and 
the private sphere of family, friendship, 
personality, intimacy on the other’ 
(Adamson, 1987/88, p.320). For Gramsci, 
civil society is traditionally occupied by 
voluntary organisations/associations, 
interest/pressure groups, mass media and 
academic institutions, all of which may 
reproduce a ‘common moral language’ 
(Green and Ward, 2004, p.4), and thus 
influences public opinion and policies or, 
alternatively, seeks to change them. 
If the funder has the contract as 
the focal point for relations with the 
community and voluntary sector, then 
What the survey responses intimate is that the 
move to contracting has led to a transformation of 
civil society ... while maintaining a semblance of 
democracy. 
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of necessity the provider must follow 
their lead. The contract facilitates 
predetermined terms, conditions and 
outcomes, outcomes which can be 
assessed and measured, though hardly, as 
Durie has observed (2004), represent real 
gains that reflect the aspirations people 
have. The survival of community and 
voluntary organisations in the contract 
environment is predicated on winning 
the contract against competition and the 
corollary of this structure is that blame for 
failure will inevitably fall on the provider. 
In Investing in Services for Outcomes, 
mentioned above, the Ministry of Social 
Development’s deputy chief executive of 
family and community services, Murray 
Edridge, said:
We have a real opportunity to 
improve how we manage contracts 
and eliminate some of the 
existing issues including, gaps and 
duplication, providers with multiple 
contracts with both MSD and other 
government agencies and short-term 
contracts which leave little stability 
for the community organisations 
we fund. (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2012)
The contract has become a means to 
increase, on the one hand, competition 
between NGO providers for an unknown 
market of funding, and on the other 
pressure for rationality and joined-up 
provision of services in the name of 
broad-based service delivery.
The two tendencies can, of course, 
realise the same end in the contract 
environment. Reduced numbers of 
NGOs able to compete in each successive 
tendering round produces survival 
uncertainty for small providers and 
can lead to monopolistic behaviour. 
Additionally, the state’s desire to deal 
with either preferred providers or the 
participants in Social Impact Bonds1 
through amalgamation which satisfies the 
provision of multiple services exacerbates 
the same tendency. In this sense, if one 
was to envisage a viable rehabilitation 
programme for ex-inmates, it would 
require mental health provision, housing, 
education, legal aid and employment, 
which could be represented by a group 
of NGOs and be funded under one 
contract.
The community and voluntary 
sector is fully aware of this focus and 
the imminent threat to their existence; 
our survey saw respondents readily 
and repeatedly acknowledge that the 
government sets the parameters of the 
competitive contract:
Particular policy was adopted and 
implement[ed], but mainly within 
economic parameters/drivers re: 
productivity and not necessarily, or 
as priority, within community/family 
development agenda. (Education 
provider)
Need to guard the independence 
of the 3rd sector and ensure, through 
contracting, we are not just pseudo-
government agencies. (Social service 
provider) 
Similarly, in a recent study of 11 non-
profit organisations one respondent 
commented: ‘people don’t listen to what 
you are saying or understand where 
you are coming from’, which effectively 
results in ‘the political feelings of the 
day or the governments views of the day 
determin[ing] our approach’ (Elliot and 
Haigh, 2012, p.15). Furthermore, recently-
resigned city missioner at the Wellington 
City Mission, Susan Blaikie, remarked 
that the organisation
has put self-preservation ahead of 
caring for the city’s poorest. … I 
think it has lost its mission. Instead 
of focusing on helping the most 
needy, including the homeless and 
youth, the mission had become 
intent of self-preservation. It has 
become too risk-averse. There is not 
enough passion. (Heather, 2013)
And Pat Hanley, in a select committee 
submission, noted that, based on his first-
hand experience in the community and 
voluntary sector,
These issues are not simply about 
funding relationships but rather 
are an expression of a perceived, 
long term threat to the ability of 
organisations within the sector to 
serve our communities and remain 
viable as not-for-profit, non-
governmental, community based and 
values led organisations. 
Furthermore, by ignoring the com-
munity the contracting environment
[d]isempowers those intended to 
benefit [from it] because they are 
not a party to the contract and 
have no effective means of affecting 
the terms of the contract, nor its 
implementation. (Hanley, 2006, p.63)
The contract, then, is a mechanism 
that has firmly come between the 
community and voluntary sector’s need 
for independence (an independence 
based on being accountable and efficient 
in terms of community needs) and the 
demands for accountability, effectiveness 
and efficiency in the (government) 
funders’ eyes. Even the auditor-general’s 
2006 report on principles that should 
guide the government in funding 
arrangements with the sector was at pains 
to point to a crucial issue:
Because of the pressure for 
accountability, public entities have 
tended to opt for a control approach 
when managing the risks in their 
relationship with NGOs. Contracts 
are seen as the way to achieve this 
control. (Office of the Auditor-
General, 2006, p.15) 
As Shaw accurately noted, this 
split between funder, purchaser and 
provider ‘greatly increased the use of 
... Annette King, noted that ‘NGOs that are funded 
by the health system are too scared to speak out 
because they fear losing their funding’ ... 
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the contractualist devices as a means 
of regulating relationships between 
purchaser and provider organisations’ 
(Shaw, 1999, p.97). This point was 
confirmed in a 2004 survey looking at 
the relationships between the Ministry of 
Health and providers. One community 
and voluntary sector organisation said 
their greatest concern was fear of speaking 
out induced by contract behaviours and 
the advocacy lobbying issues (Health 
and Disability Sector NGO Working 
Group, 2005, p.16). In an April 2013 
Radio New Zealand interview, opposition 
spokesperson for health, Annette King, 
noted that ‘NGOs that are funded by the 
health system are too scared to speak out 
because they fear losing their funding’ 
(Radio New Zealand, 2013).
The climate of fear and risk-aversion 
created by a neo-liberal contract state and 
the relationship this generates with the 
community and voluntary sector seems to 
easily nullify repeated and acknowledged 
ideals of and for the sector (even held by 
the state), which stands as an accepted 
and unquestioned contradiction in the 
funder’s mind. In 2005, Brenda Ratcliff, 
director of the Office for the Community 
and Voluntary Sector, in a briefing to the 
incoming minister described the sector as 
‘an avenue for the expression of diverse 
voices’, providing ‘networks’, ‘relationships’ 
and a ‘dialogue’ between the government 
and the community. Further, she stated 
that the NGO sector can ‘develop local 
solutions to local problems’, facilitate 
an ‘early warning system’ for problems, 
and is in the best position to ‘innovate’ 
or take ‘risks’ in finding viable solutions 
(Office for the Community and Voluntary 
Sector, 2005, pp.1-3). Three years later, 
then director Alasdair Finnie, in a similar 
briefing, maintained a supportive stance, 
noting that: ‘With total revenue exceeding 
$8 billion, these organisations offer citizens 
access to public services outside the state 
sector. They also provide a voice for many 
parts of our society, particularly for those 
who are disadvantaged’ (OCVS, 2008, p.ii). 
Even in the state sector, the 2011 Social 
Sector Forum2 reported in their briefing 
to the incoming government that:
We want to do more to harness the 
expertise of communities, non-
government organisations and 
private sector organisations that 
provide social services. Communities 
usually know what services and 
support they need. … Local 
organisations are often best placed 
to respond to local needs, to join up 
services, and to try new things to 
help people succeed. (Social Sector 
Forum, 2011)
However, responses to our survey 
showed that government funders do 
not readily allow ‘diverse voices’, the 
‘voice of the community’ or public 
‘dialogue’ involving the community and 
voluntary sector. The mechanism of the 
contract in some cases explicitly prohibits 
commentary (15% of our respondents 
said there were ‘gag clauses’ in their 
contracts):
[Our contract states we are] basically 
not to enter into public debate. 
(Family centre)  
... there is a general expectation 
of no surprises in relation to public 
statements that are critical. (Religious 
social service provider) 
In some contracts [it can be] 
more explicit about not commenting 
unless agreed with funder, other 
pressure not to rock the boat is more 
subtle. (Advocacy organisation) 
BUT workers ALWAYS have to 
get anything going into media or the 
public realm checked and approved. 
(Religious social service provider)
Even when there were no overt 
gag clauses in government contracts, 
respondents rationalised their caution 
about public comment or noted the 
contractual provisions which point to the 
power differential between provider and 
funder:
 We do not want to draw attention to 
ourselves in case we lose our funding. 
(Education and service provider)
We shouldn’t be seen to be 
criticising our partner publicly. 
(Feminist social service provider)
Creating ‘distrust’ may 
jeopardise contract negotiations. 
(Employment and social service 
provider) 
While gag clauses might have been 
few, over half of the 153 community 
and voluntary sector organisations who 
responded to our survey felt that speaking 
out would lead to contract termination. 
And the fragility and uncertainty of the 
contract environment is evident in the 
survey responses. In all, 35.3% of the 
organisations who responded had been 
subject to loss of contracts in the last ten 
years when programmes had been either 
disestablished or terminated or when 
funding was re-targeted. Even personnel 
changes in the funder organisation could 
mean that a constructive relationship was 
gone.
Exacerbating the fear and further 
influencing the relationship in 
the contract environment is the 
Charities Act 2005 and the Charities 
Commission, which have become tools 
for disciplining the community and 
voluntary sector. Registration under the 
act confers charitable status and allows 
a tax exemption, alongside supposedly 
encouraging public ‘trust and confidence 
in the charitable sector’ (section 10(1)(a)). 
Over 25,500 charities are registered in New 
Zealand (Barker and Yesberg, 2011), and 
since 2007 the commission has received 
30,000 applications for charity status, of 
In all, 35.3% of the organisations who responded 
had been subject to loss of contracts ... when 
programmes had been either disestablished or 
terminated or when funding was re-targeted.
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which it has declined 1,350, and removed 
1,000 organisations (Fowler, 2010). 
Controversially, trading operations 
owned by charities are not subject to 
income tax, hence the exemption (Barker 
and Yesberg, 2011, p.41). What qualifies 
one for charitable status is called, in brief, 
the four ‘heads’ of charity: the relief of 
poverty, the advancement of education, 
and the advancement of religion or ‘any 
other matter beneficial to the community’ 
(Commissioners for Special Purposes of 
the Income Tax v Pemsel [1891] AC 531, 
583, in Barker and Yesberg, 2011, p.42). 
According to Barker and Yesberg, the issues 
of purpose and activities, in addition to 
the understanding of advocacy, have 
become the interpretive mechanism by 
which the act has excluded organisations 
from charitable status. ‘Advocacy is a 
non-charitable purpose’, the act states 
(section 5(3)), supported by the decision 
in Bowman v Secular Society ([1917] AC 
406), the result of which is that, as Barker 
and Yesberg note, ‘Many charities now 
fear that advocating for their causes risks 
jeopardising their charitable status’ (p.43). 
Respondents’ feelings in our survey are 
summarised in the following statements:
The Charities Commission has 
the potential to stifle NGOs from 
advocating and lobbying. (Advocacy 
organisation)
There is still a strong fear that 
groups will lose their charitable 
status and/or funding from certain 
quarters if they engage in lobbying or 
advocacy. (Advocacy organisation)
Some organisations in the community 
and voluntary sector respond to this 
situation by choosing not to seek 
government funding. Forty-three of our 
153 respondents did not answer the 
question on whether funding arrangements 
prohibited public comment, with many 
of these groups stating that they did not 
seek or receive government funding in 
the first place. For a number of groups it 
was an explicit choice: ‘We do not receive 
government/contract funding but do this 
so we can be free to advocate on behalf of 
community on health and policy issues’ 
(health provider).
Additionally, the contract environment 
presents a litany of other barriers to 
the community and voluntary sector’s 
engagement in democratic debate:
Bureaucrats seem to know what 
is best for all, community doesn’t 
count. (Social service provider)
Government officials seem to 
be the biggest barrier to change. 
They minimise the knowledge 
and expertise of NGOs at times. 
(Disabilities social service provider)
Government has been prepared 
to engage on issues but are often 
poorly informed as the trust and 
engagement of officials appear very 
low. (Advocacy organisation)
Role in policy planning is being 
made more difficult; very effectively 
undermine[d]. This government in 
particular does not value consumer 
input as a partnership voice (at least 
in the health sector) and appears to 
be captured by ‘expert professionals’ 
and private sector economic interests 
for short term political gains. 
(Feminist health provider)
Insufficient knowledge exists 
about the economic inputs/outputs 
and outcomes provided by not-
for-profits, particularly those that 
are community based. As a result 
insufficient value and recognition 
is given to the sector, and minimal 
(minimised) contributions are sought 
on key political/social/economic 
issues, in processes such as taskforces, 
ministerial working groups, etc. 
(Education provider)
Most of our concerns were less 
about the intent of policy than the 
manner or detail of implementation. 
In our experience the Labour-led 
government had a particular bent 
for reporting as a substitute for 
accountability that led to some 
distortions of process that actively 
inhibited achievement of stated goals. 
(Social service provider)
That final comment sets out the high 
cost of compliance in the new contract 
environment, something that has also 
been noted by Jan Dowland of Platform 
Charitable Trust:
A disproportionate amount of 
energy is expended on administering 
a clumsy, highly specified, over 
engineered system diverting precious 
resources away from the real work. 
The dictates of the system have 
dominated the discussions between 
DHBs and NGOs, rather than how 
to improve the lives of people with 
addiction and mental health issues. 
(Platform Charitable Trust, 2009, p.4) 
The community and voluntary sector, 
which has for decades provided grass-
roots knowledge to help problem-solving 
in communities, is ignored, dismissed or 
disputed, leaving the partnership between 
provider and funder bereft of informed 
consent. 
Conclusion
For many of our community and 
voluntary sector respondents the contract 
environment under both Labour- and 
National-led governments has led to 
heightened fears surrounding several 
issues: funding being cut; difficulties in 
maintaining independence while taking 
government contract funding; restrictions 
on what services they can provide to 
whom, and how these will be provided; 
and the redirection of their labour to meet 
the efficiency and accountability demands 
of government funders. The expectation 
The supposed ‘equal’ relationship is one that in 
reality focuses attention on meeting the demands 
of government funders rather than the needs of the 
communities.
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is not that the government will provide 
funding without any strings attached. 
However, the contract environment 
ignores the power differential between 
provider and funder, reducing it to a 
relationship of equals supposedly doing 
‘business’ together. The supposed ‘equal’ 
relationship is one that in reality focuses 
attention on meeting the demands of 
government funders rather than the needs 
of the communities. This is both an attack 
on civil society and its democratic role, 
and will result in community needs, which 
do not easily fit the outcome measurement 
criteria set by central government agencies, 
being left unmet. The community and 
voluntary sector, as responses to our 
survey illustrate, is acutely aware of the 
difficulties being caused by the neo-liberal 
contract environment, unduly funder-
centric and focused on apportioning 
risk, accountability obligations and 
enforcement measures. Recovering the 
true and full democratic voice of the 
community and voluntary sector requires 
a rethinking of the contract environment. 
This may require the abandonment of the 
contract and its replacement with a funding 
regime that enables genuine respect for, 
and trust of, both the community and 
its representatives (the community and 
voluntary sector); a funding system that 
enables a full democratic role for the 
community and voluntary sector, allowing 
them to fulfil their self-defined role of 
meeting the needs of their communities.
1 The Office for the Community and Voluntary Sector and 
the Department of Internal Affairs commissioned a report 
to ‘explore the nature of Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) … to 
identify … policy and market constraints to their extensive 
use’. Essentially this is a means of introducing money from 
private or philanthropic investors into ‘social programmes 
without increasing public debt and without the need to 
decrease existing spending’ (Ross Philipson Consulting, 
2011). The government repays funds depending on the level 
of success in achieving the specific social outcomes. 
 2 The Social Sector Forum has been described as a cross-
agency vehicle made up of the chief executive officers of 
the Ministry of Social Development and the Department of 
Building and Housing, the director-general of health, the 
secretaries of Justice and Health and senior officials from the 
SSC, Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.
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